2025.07.24
Stablecoins have become a crucial medium for on-chain payments in recent years, playing a key role in transaction settlement and value storage. With shifts in the crypto market’s interest rate environment, users have developed a strong demand for stablecoins to “earn interest” (i.e. earning interest or returns simply by holding them). However, regulators want stablecoins to behave more like safe payment tools, rather than unregulated high-yield deposits. This contradiction between a strong market demand and compliance requirements is becoming a core issue in stablecoin development.
Currently, major jurisdictions such as the United States and the European Union are enacting or proposing regulations that explicitly prohibit stablecoin issuers from paying interest to holders. This regulatory tightening puts the interest-bearing feature of stablecoins under compliance scrutiny. In this article, we will explore why on-chain payments would need a yield (interest) feature, how mainstream stablecoins achieve returns through DeFi, and how this feature conflicts with and could be balanced against the current regulatory framework.
User Demand: For regular users and institutions, earning interest on stablecoins is a must-have need. In traditional finance, cash deposits yield interest or money market returns, so holding digital dollars comes with an expectation of payoff as well. Data shows that stablecoin issuers have earned considerable interest income from their reserve assets (for example, Tether made about $7.7 billion in interest from reserves in the past year). In a high interest rate environment, idle stablecoin funds have a strong desire to appreciate. A yield feature can increase users’ willingness to hold stablecoins – and for longer durations – which helps expand the stablecoin ecosystem.
Boosting Competitiveness: The rise of yield-bearing stablecoins is also tied to issuers competing for market share. When a stablecoin promises a return for holding it, it can quickly attract users to move their funds over. For example, the Ethena protocol’s USDe stablecoin uses innovative strategies to offer a double-digit annual yield to holders, driving its circulating market cap to surge in a short time and making it the fourth-largest stablecoin by market value. Clearly, yield rates have become a new battleground among stablecoins – whoever can provide returns legally and safely will be far more attractive.
Mature DeFi Ecosystem: The DeFi space has already developed multiple sources of relatively low-risk yield (such as decentralized lending, liquidity mining, staking rewards, etc.). If a stablecoin integrates a yield function, it effectively saves users from the steps of manually participating in DeFi – they can directly enjoy passive income. This is appealing to new users who want simplified operations, and it pushes stablecoins from being a purely payment medium toward a dual “payment + wealth management” tool.However, yield and risk go hand in hand. Does adding an interest-bearing feature undermine a stablecoin’s safety as a stable payment instrument? Where do the returns come from, can they be sustained, and what are the potential risks? These questions require careful evaluation.
Although issuers of fiat-reserve-backed stablecoins like USDC, USDT, and PYUSD invest their reserves in relatively safe assets to earn interest, those earnings go to the issuer – none of these currently pay interest directly to holders.However, users can still obtain yields by deploying these stablecoins into DeFi protocols. Below we focus on several representative stablecoins and how one can earn returns with them on-chain:
USDC: Issued by Circle and 100% backed by cash and short-term U.S. Treasury bills. USDC itself strictly adheres to compliance and does not pay any interest to users for holding it. But holders commonly deposit USDC into decentralized lending platforms (like Aave or Compound) to earn interest, with rates depending on market borrowing demand. Additionally, some centralized platforms (such as Coinbase) briefly offered USDC holding rewards to non-U.S. users, but these were halted due to regulatory concerns. In short, USDC’s yield is realized primarily via external DeFi channels; the issuer itself provides no returns.
USDT: The largest stablecoin by market cap, backed by reserves in fiat currency and government bonds. Similar to USDC, USDT’s issuer does not pay interest to holders, but users widely use USDT in liquidity mining and lending to earn yields. On certain DeFi protocols, the deposit APY for USDT fluctuates with supply and demand. Notably, Tether earned enormous interest income from its reserves over the past year but shares none of it with USDT holders – a fact that has fueled market calls for models that share reserve earnings with users.
DAI: The flagship decentralized stablecoin, generated by over-collateralized crypto assets. DAI’s unique feature is an in-built deposit interest mechanism – the Dai Savings Rate (DSR). Holders can deposit DAI into the Maker protocol’s DSR contract to earn about 3.5% APY (funded by the protocol’s revenues). This means DAI itself has a yield-bearing function, appreciating in value without requiring a third-party platform. Additionally, like other stablecoins, DAI can be supplied to lending markets or liquidity pools to earn extra yield. DAI’s model demonstrates that a decentralized protocol can directly share yield with stablecoin holders, though this blurs into a regulatory grey area.
PYUSD: A U.S. dollar stablecoin issued by payments giant PayPal, positioned for payment and money transfer scenarios. PYUSD abides by U.S. regulatory requirements, with reserves in cash and similarly safe assets, and it currently offers no interest for holding. PayPal prefers to promote PYUSD as a payment instrument rather than an investment product. However, in the future PYUSD might connect to DeFi applications, allowing users to decide for themselves whether to pursue additional yield.
USD1: An emerging stablecoin launched in 2025 by World Liberty Financial. USD1 likewise maintains 100% fiat reserves, held with a regulated custodian (BitGo). Its design emphasizes compliance and institutional use, explicitly avoiding high-risk yield-generation strategies. In other words, USD1 – unlike DAI – does not accrue interest by itself, and instead prioritizes safety and transparency. Nonetheless, holders can still convert USD1 into other yield-bearing assets or participate in lending on-chain. USD1’s approach shows that some new issuers are choosing a conservative stance on yield features to better meet regulatory standards and build market trust early on.
When users deploy stablecoins into DeFi, they can earn returns via multiple types of protocols. We can categorize these mechanisms into three groups – lending protocols, staking/liquidity protocols, and derivative-based protocols – and analyze how each works, their risks, and the different regulatory considerations:
Lending Protocols (e.g., Aave, Compound, Morpho) Mechanism: Users deposit stablecoins into lending pools as liquidity for borrowers, and in return the depositors earn interest. Rates are determined by market supply and demand, typically rising as utilization of the pool increases. Optimized protocols like Morpho build on Compound/Aave to offer higher rates, giving depositors a near peer-to-peer matched yield. The source of the yield is the interest paid by borrowers – a classic financial intermediation model. Risks: Credit risk – although lending platforms usually require over-collateralization, extreme market volatility can lead to collateral value dropping too far, borrower defaults, and losses for depositors. Technical risk – smart contract vulnerabilities or failures in the liquidation mechanism could also result in fund losses. Interest rate volatility – returns are not fixed; when capital is abundant, rates can be very low, making yields highly unpredictable. Regulatory Considerations: If stablecoins are widely used in permissionless lending, it could trigger regulations related to depositor protection or capital requirements akin to those for banks. At present, protocols like Aave operate without direct regulation, but in the future regulators may mandate compliance measures on user interfaces (e.g. KYC for front-end access) or restrict regulated entities from participating. Notably, the U.S. GENIUS Act defines “digital asset service providers” that must register, which could bring DeFi lending platforms under scrutiny. In the short term, lending protocols remain in a grey area, but stablecoin issuers and regulators are paying close attention to their potential systemic risks.
Staking/Liquidity Protocols (e.g., yield farming, aggregators) Mechanism: This category covers locking stablecoins in certain protocols to earn rewards, or providing stablecoin liquidity in exchange for fees and incentives. For example, users can deposit USDC/USDT into a Curve liquidity pool to earn trading fees plus protocol token rewards, or into Yearn Finance vaults where strategy contracts automatically allocate funds across platforms for the best return. Some projects even issue yield-bearing stablecoins that automatically deploy users’ funds into DeFi to earn yield, then distribute the returns pro rata to the holders. All of these can be seen as broad forms of staking-based yield: the user hands over stablecoins to a contract/strategy in exchange for passive income. Risks: Smart contract and platform risk – these strategies are often complex, involving multiple contract layers and cross-protocol operations. A flaw in any component can lead to funds being stolen or lost. Liquidity risk – if you provide stablecoins to a liquidity pool and the other asset in the pool is highly volatile or collapses, the stablecoin provider can suffer impermanent loss or face difficulty withdrawing funds. Project governance risk – some yield aggregators have strategies set by a team or DAO, which could pursue overly aggressive tactics or make management errors that put funds at risk. Regulatory Considerations: Liquidity mining and yield aggregation activities are essentially analogous to asset management or investment products. Once there is an element of raising funds from the public with a promise of returns, it draws attention from securities regulators. For example, the U.S. SEC might deem certain tokens with promised yield as securities. Many yield aggregator projects therefore limit offerings to accredited investors or avoid explicit return guarantees. If a stablecoin issuer were to directly build in such yield functions (for instance, automatically investing reserves into DeFi), it would clearly cross regulatory red lines – precisely what various national rules forbid. Thus, currently, staking-type yields are mostly offered by third-party DeFi protocols, with stablecoin issuers keeping a distance. In the future, however, regulators may require these protocols to provide clearer disclosures and risk warnings, or even bring large yield aggregators under frameworks for investment advisers/funds.
Derivatives Protocols (e.g., Pendle, Yield Protocol and other interest derivatives) Mechanism: These platforms offer financial derivative trading on yield or interest. For example, Pendle allows a user to take a yield-bearing asset (say an interest-bearing stablecoin or staked token) and split it into a principal token and an interest token, which can be traded separately. Investors can thereby lock in a fixed rate (by selling their future interest rights to someone else up front) or speculate on the direction of interest rates (trading the interest token’s price). For stablecoin holders, such protocols provide tools to lock in future yield or cash out future interest early. Similarly, some protocols have introduced interest rate swaps, futures, etc., enriching the on-chain interest rate market. Risks: Complexity risk – derivatives are complex, and ordinary users who don’t understand the hidden risks might engage in high-leverage yield trades and incur heavy losses. Market liquidity risk – these nascent interest markets are shallow; in volatile conditions, interest token prices can swing dramatically, and there’s a risk of liquidity drying up or being unable to exit positions. Systemic risk – large-scale trading of interest derivatives layered on top of base lending markets can amplify volatility and potentially impact stablecoin pegs or stability indirectly. Regulatory Considerations: In traditional finance, interest-rate derivatives are strictly regulated (often confined to regulated exchanges or trading facilities). Pendle and similar decentralized interest products currently operate in a regulatory vacuum, but their financial nature is evident. In the future, regulators might focus on issues like participant eligibility and suitability (to prevent retail investors from over-speculating in complex derivatives), or whether these platforms require licenses (analogous to a swap execution facility). While stablecoins themselves are just the underlying asset, if a derivatives market threatens a stablecoin’s stability or the interests of its holders, issuers and regulators will become vigilant. In the near term, derivatives protocols and stablecoin issuers are not directly connected, but under a comprehensive regulatory regime, any external protocol that could affect a stablecoin’s value stability or holders’ interests might come under regulatory review.
Stablecoin interest features have drawn regulatory attention chiefly because they blur the line between a payment tool and an investment product, potentially touching upon banking, securities, and other financial regulations. Below we outline recent regulatory developments in the U.S. and EU, and how these rules affect stablecoins pursuing DeFi-based yields:
In July 2025, the U.S. Congress passed and the President signed into law the first-ever federal stablecoin legislation – the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act, nicknamed the “Genius Act”). This Act establishes a federal regulatory framework for stablecoin issuance, and it contains provisions directly addressing interest-bearing features, including:
Ban on paying interest: The Act explicitly stipulates that compliant payment stablecoins must not pay any yield or interest to a holder for simply holding, using, or storing the stablecoin. In other words, holding the stablecoin itself cannot bring the user any additional monetary reward. This prohibition closes off the possibility of issuers attracting “deposits” by offering interest, ensuring stablecoins do not turn into unregulated savings accounts. Lawmakers even stated bluntly that this move is to protect the U.S. banking system by preventing stablecoins from siphoning away bank deposits. It also eliminates the gray area that previously existed with yield-bearing stablecoins in DeFi, forcing stablecoins to return to their core payment purpose.
Reserve requirements and risk limits: The GENIUS Act mandates that stablecoins be 100% backed by highly liquid, safe assets (cash or short-term U.S. Treasury bills) and forbids using reserve assets for any purpose other than satisfying redemption. This means issuers cannot reinvest reserve funds into risky or high-yield assets (including DeFi protocols). Reserves must remain static (or only used in limited ways to meet redemptions and ensure liquidity). This rule stops issuers from leveraging reserves to actively seek yield, which naturally means they cannot generate extra revenue to pay out to holders.
Licensing of issuers and compliance obligations: The Act creates a licensing regime for payment stablecoin issuers – only federally approved entities can issue compliant stablecoins. Licensed issuers must also fulfill numerous obligations such as anti-money-laundering controls, cybersecurity standards, and reserve disclosures. Importantly, issuers are prohibited from suggesting in marketing that stablecoins have government backing or federal insurance. This reflects the regulatory view of stablecoins’ nature: they are not bank deposits protected by deposit insurance, and therefore should not have bank-like interest. The interest ban is consistent with this positioning of stablecoins.
Impact on DeFi yield protocols: The GENIUS Act itself does not explicitly mention decentralized protocols, but its provisions have indirect effects:
First, issuing a compliant stablecoin in the U.S. will not allow any built-in yield mechanism. Models like MakerDAO’s DAI Savings Rate or Ethena’s interest-bearing USDe, which provide returns to holders, would have to remove direct yield payouts if they want to operate under U.S. regulations. This could force those projects to adjust their products or relocate their operations outside the U.S.
Second, the Act makes it unlawful for any unlicensed entity to issue or sell payment stablecoins to U.S. persons. This means yield-bearing stablecoins launched abroad (certain innovative stablecoins) will face strict limitations entering the U.S. market. U.S.-licensed digital asset services (exchanges, wallets, etc.) likely cannot legally offer such stablecoins to users. If DeFi protocol front-ends cater to U.S. users, they would need to block access to non-compliant stablecoins as well.
Third, the Act calls for studies on DeFi’s impact. While it doesn’t immediately ban decentralized protocols, regulators may use this mandate to evaluate whether stablecoin yields obtained through DeFi amount to an evasion of the rules. For example, if a compliant stablecoin issuer were to “assist” users in depositing coins into DeFi to earn interest, would that be considered an indirect form of paying interest? The GENIUS Act doesn’t detail this, but other regions (like Hong Kong’s draft regulations) have explicitly prohibited issuers from facilitating any interest payments. It’s conceivable that U.S. regulators might later clarify similar points.
In summary, by banning stablecoin interest and restricting reserve usage, the GENIUS Act effectively ends the possibility of compliant stablecoins offering direct yield. U.S. regulators’ intent is very clear: stablecoins are digital cash substitutes, not investment products. This will have far-reaching implications for stablecoin issuers and how DeFi innovations interact with stablecoins.
In 2023, the EU passed the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation. MiCA includes specific requirements for stablecoins (classified as either E-Money Tokens, EMTs, or Asset-Referenced Tokens, ARTs) and is seen as a regulatory framework with major impact on the global stablecoin market. Regarding interest-bearing features, MiCA also takes a firmly prohibitive stance:
Interest ban: MiCA Article 40 (for ARTs) and Article 50 (for EMTs) explicitly state that an issuer must not provide any form of interest or other benefit to token holders. “Interest” is broadly defined as any reward paid based on holding duration. This means that no matter what asset a stablecoin references, an issuer in the EU is categorically forbidden from giving holders any additional return. European lawmakers’ intent is to prevent stablecoins from effectively becoming investment products and to avoid undermining the bank savings business. Likewise, MiCA requires that stablecoin issuers be licensed (as an electronic money institution or other authorized issuer), so any stablecoin issued under MiCA’s regime must strictly implement a zero-interest policy.
Market impact: The impending implementation of MiCA has already prompted market reactions. Some issuers in Europe are proactively adjusting or exiting the market: for example, Tether announced it would gradually cease operating its euro-pegged stablecoin EURT, citing MiCA’s new requirements (including the interest ban) as one factor complicating its operations. Similarly, Coinbase terminated its USDC holding rewards (interest) program for EU customers to comply with MiCA. MiCA’s interest prohibition directly put an end to stablecoin holder yield incentives in the EU.
Stablecoin categories and obligations: MiCA divides stablecoins into EMTs (primarily used as a means of payment) and ARTs (value reference tied to a basket of assets or a single non-fiat asset). In both cases, issuers must obtain the appropriate authorization and adhere to strict requirements on reserves, whitepaper disclosure, and risk management. These requirements, much like those in the U.S., emphasize sufficient reserves, timely redemption, and risk segregation, and likewise confer no rights to any income for the holder. Under this framework, a stablecoin is more akin to electronic money or pre-paid value, legally separated from bank deposits or securities (bank deposits can pay interest but are governed by banking law; securities can provide returns but are subject to securities law disclosure and regulation).
Impact on yield-focused designs: Under MiCA, if a stablecoin wants to offer a yield, it would have to step outside the stablecoin regulatory category entirely – for instance, by structuring the product as a fund share or other security token. In fact, the market has begun introducing compliant alternatives to satisfy yield demand: namely, tokenized money market funds. Since stablecoins cannot pay interest, a large amount of capital may flow into on-chain money-market funds or tokenized treasury bill products. These products are essentially securities, subject to existing financial regulations (including KYC and disclosure), but they can circulate on blockchains and integrate with DeFi. JPMorgan has predicted that such “yield-bearing digital cash alternatives” will, in the future, take up half of the stablecoin ecosystem’s market share. This indicates that the market hasn’t given up on chasing yield — it’s simply shifting to other vehicles under the purview of regulation. For DeFi developers, the takeaway from MiCA is that pure payment stablecoins will have their yield function stripped away, with yield opportunities likely reappearing in new, compliant asset forms. This kind of bifurcation is recognized by both regulators and the market: MiCA ensures payment stablecoins operate robustly, while also leaving space for regulated yield products to meet investment needs.
Hong Kong: In late 2023, Hong Kong’s Monetary Authority proposed a draft Stablecoin Regulation that likewise contains a “no-interest policy” clause: it would ban any licensed stablecoin issuer from paying interest to holders, or assisting in any form of interest payment. This mirrors the U.S. and EU approach, ensuring that fiat-pegged stablecoins do not covertly become yield-bearing instruments. Notably, Hong Kong’s draft primarily regulates fiat-backed stablecoins; for non-fiat-pegged stablecoins with yield features (such as algorithmic stablecoins or crypto-collateralized stablecoins that offer interest), there are no explicit provisions yet. This indicates that regulators are focusing first on stablecoins directly linked to the fiat system.
Other countries: Japan, Singapore, and others are also studying stablecoin regulations. Most lean toward requiring banks or similarly regulated institutions to issue stablecoins, and avoiding any promise of returns to the general public. The global trend of tighter regulation means stablecoin issuers must carefully balance compliance and innovation. In any jurisdiction, once a stablecoin promises or produces a fixed return, it could be reclassified as a security or a collective investment product, triggering far more onerous regulatory requirements. This undoubtedly raises the compliance difficulty and cost for any interest-bearing stablecoin model.
Facing heavy regulatory pressure and strong market demand, the stablecoin industry stands at a crossroads: should it strictly adhere to its payment-tool nature and forgo the temptation of yields, or cater to users’ demands and innovate with interest features while taking on compliance risks? Perhaps we can examine this issue from the following angles to find a compromise:
Compliance positioning as a payment tool: Regulators expect stablecoins to serve a role similar to electronic cash, used for payments and settlements. To uphold financial stability and the effectiveness of monetary policy, regulators do not want stablecoins to steal banks’ deposit customers (by offering interest). Thus, keeping stablecoins non-interest-bearing protects the banking system and is also a key measure to prevent runs on stablecoins (since holders are not losing out on interest by redeeming, they have less incentive to suddenly cash out). If compliant stablecoin issuers accept this role, they should focus on improving payment reliability, on-chain transaction convenience, and similar features, integrating into mainstream finance in a regulator-friendly manner. PYUSD and USD1 are illustrative examples: they emphasize safety, transparency, and zero interest, in exchange for regulatory trust and broader adoption opportunities.
The market’s thirst for returns: From the user’s perspective, a big part of stablecoins’ appeal is that they can gain value in decentralized settings. Even if issuers don’t pay interest, users will find ways to earn yield (through lending, staking, etc.). Especially in the current global rising-rate cycle, holding stablecoins at 0% interest is seen as an opportunity cost. The market has already voted with its feet: the market cap of yield-bearing stablecoins grew from under $1 billion in 2023 to nearly $10 billion by 2025 (including products like USDe, USDY, etc.), indicating genuine demand for such products. And DeFi users’ expectations for stablecoin returns have become increasingly fixed; some projects are openly advertising “stablecoins can also earn XX% interest” to attract funds. If this demand is completely suppressed, it could drive capital and innovation into unregulated gray areas, increasing hidden risks to the financial system. Therefore, finding ways to meet some of the market demand within a compliant framework is a question regulators and the industry need to consider together.
Separating the payment and yield functions: One possible balancing approach is to separate the stablecoin’s payment utility from its investment utility — the stablecoin itself remains strictly non-yield-bearing, but around it, regulated yield-bearing products are developed. For example, an issuer or financial institution could launch an on-chain money market fund token, which users can purchase with stablecoins to earn interest (from U.S. Treasury yields, for instance). Such a token is essentially a security (a fund share) complying with securities laws, but it can be exchanged on-chain for stablecoins, achieving compatibility. In this model, payments continue to use the stablecoin, while investments use a regulated yield token, and market mechanisms connect the two. This is analogous to how many banks offer a money market fund alongside a payment account, but on a blockchain the integration could be seamless. Research by JPMorgan also supports this direction, observing that since stablecoins can’t pay interest, funds will naturally flow into tokenized money market funds, which are expected to rapidly grow in share.
Dual-token models as a workaround: Some projects are attempting to bypass regulatory no-go zones using dual-token designs. For example, the Usual Money protocol issued two tokens: USD0 and USD0++. USD0 is a 1:1 USD-pegged stablecoin with no interest; if a holder wants to earn yield, they can convert USD0 to USD0++, which entitles the holder to the underlying U.S. Treasury interest, though one must convert back to redeem the principal. This design achieves interest distribution technically, yet legally USD0 (the stablecoin) remains non-interest-bearing, aiming to comply with MiCA and similar regulations. It remains to be seen whether regulators will accept this approach, but it offers a potential angle: through innovative product structuring, try to satisfy users’ yield desires while still adhering to the letter of regulatory requirements.
In summary, amid the tug-of-war between compliance and market demand, stablecoin issuers should embrace compliance and lay a solid foundation, innovating yield products only within legal boundaries; regulators, for their part, should closely watch market developments and be prepared to fine-tune rules to balance financial security with innovative vitality. The original intent of stablecoins as payment tools should not be betrayed, but users’ legitimate demand for financial returns should also have a reasonable avenue. Striking this balance will determine the future status and role of stablecoins in the mainstream financial system.
Integrating yield features into on-chain payments is a significant experiment in the evolution of stablecoins, and it’s a contest that cannot be avoided. On one side is the user and market thirst for earning interest on digital dollars, which drives continuous technological and product innovation; on the other side is the regulators’ insistence on financial stability and consumer protection, drawing red lines that stablecoins must not cross. This article examined how mainstream stablecoins obtain yield through DeFi, and how regulations like the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU’s MiCA restrict such features and what that means.
In the foreseeable short term, stablecoins are likely to return to their payment essence, with compliant issuers avoiding direct interest offerings to meet regulatory requirements. But the market’s exploration will not stop: compliant yield alternatives, innovative architectural designs, and DeFi community experiments will continue to emerge. As the regulatory landscape becomes clearer, stablecoin projects must be even more cautious in crafting models that balance yield with compliance. Understanding the regulatory context in this domain is crucial — it dictates the boundaries of business design and the room for future innovation.
As a bridge between the crypto world and traditional finance, stablecoins’ evolution influences the entire digital economy landscape. The fusion of payments and yield, if achieved within a compliant framework, would greatly enhance blockchain finance’s value proposition; conversely, if mishandled, it could provoke regulatory headwinds or even market turbulence. We believe that through rational dialogue and exploration, the future will yield new paradigms that meet users’ demand for returns without violating the spirit of regulation, allowing stablecoins to truly serve as safe and efficient digital value carriers. In this race between innovation and regulation, only professionalism and prudence can carry one further.